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This paper attempts to quantify one of the most deeply con-
tested terms in constitutional law: "judicial activism". 1 Most dis-
cussions of "judicial activism" define activism either in reference 
to a particular political ideology (such as complaints about "lib-
eral activist judges") or a particular method of constitutional in-
terpretation (such as assertions that a decision was "activist" be-
cause it was not based on the original meaning of the 
Constitution). 2 This paper sidesteps those debates, focusing in-
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1. The contested nature of this term led one judge to assert that the only meaning-
ful definition of judicial activism is "a decision one does not like." William P Marshall. 
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism. 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217 (2002) 
(citing Stephen 0. Kline. Judicial Independence. Relmjjing Congressional Attacks on 1he 
Third Branch. R'i KY. L.J. 67'1. 6RR n.26 (199R)). Randy Barnett has noted that the term 
as usually used is both peJorative and "generally empty." Randy E. Barnett. Is 1he 
Rehnquist Court an "Aclivist" Court~ The Commerce Clause Cases. 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1275. 1275 (2002) (Barnett offers his own definition of activism. He argues that "it is ac-
tivist for courts to adopt doctrines that contradict the text of the Constitution either to 
uphold or nullify a law ... [and to] substitute for the relevant constitutional provision an-
other provision that they think. for whatever reason. is preferable." To Barnett. activism 
therefore can consist of either striking down or failing to strike down legislation.) 
2. Political actors in particular have frequently invoked the first image of judicial 
activism. complaining about "liberal judicial activists" replacing the "will of the people" 
with their own preferred policy outcomes. See. for example. the following comments by 
President George W. Bush: "As you know. I'm a person who believes in judicial re-
straint. as opposed to judicial activism that takes the place of the legislative branch." (in-
terview with Diane Sawyer. ABC News. Dec. 16. 2003): noting during the 2004 presiden-
tial campaign that if a Democrat wins the presidency. "they could lock in liberal judic1al 
activism for the next generation" (Atlantic Monthly. vol 2'14. issue 4. Nov. 1. 2004). Po-
litical actors also invoke the second image. See George W. Bush. noting in that same 
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stead on an empirical examination of how recent U.S. Supreme 
Court justices have in fact exercised their judicial power. I do 
this by examining the voting records of the individual justices in 
three areas: how often did the justices vote to invalidate federal 
legislation, how often did they do so in relation to state legisla-
tion, and how often did they vote to overturn existing judicial 
precedents?) I also examine the issue areas in which each of the 
justices cast these votes and the ideological direction of the 
votes. 
My approach consequently does not address the substantive 
questions of when or how judges should use their power of judi-
cial review to invalidate legislation or overturn precedent. In-
stead, I simply examine how the justices are in fact using those 
powers! My goal in using this purely quantifiable approach is to 
campaign that he wants to appoint federal judges who "know the difference between 
personal opinion and the strict interpretation of the law" (The Washington Post, May 2':1, 
2005, Outlook Section, p. B01). President Ronald Reagan, who appointed three of the 
justices studied here (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Scalia) stated that he intended to 
appoint justices ·'who understand the danger of short-circuiting the electoral process and 
disenfranchising the people through judicial activism." Donald H. Zeigler, The New Ac-
tivist Court. 45 AM. U.L. REV. 1367, 136~ (19':16) (citing Bernard Weinraub, Reagan Says 
He'll Use Vacancies to Discourage Judicial Activism, N.Y. TIMES, October 21, 19~5. at 
Al). Consider also the statement of Republican Senator Orrin Hatch at the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee Hearings regarding the nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas: "But 
what liberals really ought to understand is that no one is safe when judges depart from 
the text of the written Constitution .... What we need are judges that won't make up the 
law in order to institutionalize their own social policy ideas or to impose their own val-
ues. liberal or conservative, on the American people." Nomination of Judge Clarence 
Thomas: Hearings he fore the Senate Commiuee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st sess. 174 
(1991) (hereinafter, Thomas Hearings). 
3. Most scholarly examinations of judicial activism include each of these three cri-
teria. For example. one scholar has argued that judicial activism has six aspects: majori-
tarianism (the degree to which policies adopted through democratic processes are ne-
gated by justices); interpretive stability (the degree to which earlier court decisions are 
altered); interpretive fidelity (the degree to which constitutional provisions are contrary 
to the clear intentions of their drafters); substance/process distinction (the degree to 
which judicial decisions make substantive policy choices); specificity of judicial policy 
making (the degree to which a judicial decision establishes policy itself); and availability 
of an alternative policymaker (the degree to which a judicial decision supersedes consid-
eration of the same problem by other governmental actors). See Bradley C. Canon, De-
fining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 236, 237 (19~3),. See also 
Christopher E. Smith and Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and 
the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 54 (1 ':193). This is a useful list; this paper at-
tempts to quantify the two items on the list-majoritarianism and interpretive stability-
that are objectively quantifiable. 
4. In doing so. I do not mean to imply that all "judicial activism" so defined is in-
valid. or that all such "activism" is equally invalid. Our society has very conflicted ideas 
about how we want judges to use their power. See Vikran Amar, The Courts; Judges 
Rule; "Legislating From the Bench": It's a Maller of Opinion, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2005 
at Ml. See also Rebecca L. Brown, Activism is Not a Four-Leller Word, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1257 (2002): Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong 
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move past the rhetorical debate about "activist judges" replacing 
legislative choices with their "personal preferences" and toward 
a more grounded examination of how all justices-liberal and 
conservative- use their judicial power. In taking this approach, I 
do not attempt to supplant the important substantive debate 
about constitutional interpretation and the role of the judiciary 
in our governing system, but rather to enrich it by providing 
quantifiable information about how recent justices actually used 
their judicial power. 
This examination of actual judicial behavior reveals several 
interesting things, each relevant to the "judicial activism" de-
bate. First, conservative justices as well as their more liberal 
counterparts actively "replace" legislative choices with their own 
preferred outcomes, and they do so at a roughly equal pace, al-
though, as shown below, they do so in different types of cases. 
Second, both liberal and conservative justices use their judicial 
power in ideologically predictable ways: with few exceptions, 
liberal justices use their power to invalidate legislation and over-
turn precedents to generate liberal outcomes and conservative 
justices use that power to generate conservative outcomes.' Fi-
nally, the most conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court 
used their power in some surprising ways, ways not easily attrib-
utable to the originalist methods of interpretation they otherwise 
advocate. That Court's most conservative justices, for example, 
did not exclusively or even primarily use their power to invali-
date federal statutes in federalism cases. While such cases were 
an important part of those justices jurisprudence, most of the 
federal invalidation votes cast by the Court's conservative jus-
tices were actually cast in First Amendment cases-an area with 
a much more uncertain originalist pedigree. 
This look at the actual voting behavior of recent Supreme 
Court justices thus provides specific, empirical data supporting 
what is evident to many Court-watchers: the interesting differ-
ence between the Court's "liberal" and "conservative" justices is 
with Conservative Judicial Auivism. 45 YILL. L. REV. 201 (2000): ARTHUR SELWY~ 
MILLER. TOWARD !;-<CREASED JLDICIAL ACTIVIS.\1: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (19112). 
5. There is a voluminous political science literature examining the relationship 
between the justices· presumed ideological preferences and their voting behavior. This 
paper is not intended to replicate in any way the exhaustive statistical examinations done 
in that research. but rather to look at the issue in the context of the particular cases re· 
viewed here. For a comprehensive discussion of the political science work in this area. 
see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH. THE SLPREME COURT A:--:D THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) 
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not whether they used their power of judicial review "actively" 
but how they used that power. Liberal justices used the power of 
judicial review to protect certain First Amendment rights, cer-
tain civil rights, and the rights of criminal defendants; conserva-
tive justices used the same power to protect other First Amend-
ment rights, other civil rights, and states' rights." The pertinent 
question, therefore, is not whether we want our justices to be 
"activist", but how and in which areas we want them to actively 
use their power. Do we want justices who protect civil and pri-
vacy rights or commercial speech and states' rights? Who defer 
to Congress or to state legislatures? Attaching the epithet of "ac-
tivism" to some of these uses of judicial power but not others 
adds heat but little light to this important debate, and my hope is 
that the information presented here will help shift the public de-
bate to more productive ground. 
EXPLANATION OF THE DATASET 
This project relies on the U.S. Supreme Court Databases 
originally developed by political scientist Harold Spaeth, refined 
by Sara Benesh, and distributed by Kirk Randazzo.7 I use two of 
the Spaeth Databases here: the Supreme Court Database, which 
includes information about what the Supreme Court as a court 
did; and the Supreme Court Justice-Centered Database, which 
includes information about what each individual Supreme Court 
justice did. The Justice-Centered Database, which is the data-
6. For a discussion of contemporary Supreme Court decisions that might be con-
sidered examples of conservative judicial activism. see Marshall supra note 1. Non-
judicial calls for the increased use of judicial review to generate politically conservative 
court decisions abound. Consider. for example, William H. Mellor's call for the increased 
use of judicial review to protect economic and property rights (William H. Mellor, The 
American Lawyer. May 1. 2005) and the push by the American Enterprise Institute to 
encourage the nomination of judges who will use their power of judicial review to roll 
back ''the entire modern welfare state" Jeffrey Rosen. The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. 
TIMES. April 17. 2005, at Section 6. Column 1, Magazine Desk, 42. 45-46; (quoting Mi-
chael Greve of the American Enterprise Institute). Not that long ago, conservative legal 
scholars were denying that such "conservative activism" could occur. For example. in 
1990 Earl Maltz considered the possibility that judicial conservatives would turn from 
deference to activism as they gained power on the courts, but he concluded at that time 
that the principle of judicial deference was too entrenched in "the conservative political 
program" for it to succeed. See Earl M. Maltz The Prospects j(Jr a Rival of Conservative 
Auivism in Comtitutional.!urisprwlence. 24 GA. L. REV. 629.649 (1990). Maltz also be-
lieved that traditional conservative jurisprudence. claiming to be grounded in democratic 
theory. necessarily combined originalism with a preference for judicial restraint. /d. at 
632-33. 635. 
7. The Spaeth Databases are available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci 
/ulmerproject. The creation of the Spaeth databases was supported by the National Sci-
ence Foundation. 
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base I primarily rely on, only extends through the Court's 2000 
terms. To provide a complete picture of the voting records of the 
justices who sat on the last Rehnquist Natural Court,' I therefore 
supplemented the Justice-Centered Database by coding the per-
tinent information for the 2001-2004 terms myself. I did this by 
first using the more up-to-date Supreme Court Database, which 
extends through and includes the Court's 2004 term, to identify 
Supreme Court cases in which constitutional issues were ad-
dressed. I then reviewed those cases and, following Spaeth's cod-
ing rules, identified and included the relevant variables in my 
dataset." 
The Justice-Centered Database also has been altered to in-
clude only those cases decided by the last justices to sit on the 
Rehnquist Natural Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer. Because these same nine justices sat together through-
out this period, this time frame provides a wealth of data while 
avoiding the difficulties associated with comparing decisions 
rendered by different justices in different cases. To ensure the 
validity of this direct justice-to-justice comparison, I have de-
leted from the dataset any cases from this period in which less 
than all nine of the justices participated. I also have removed in-
formally issued opinions, including memorandum opinions and 
decrees, opting instead to include only formally decided cases in 
which the Court heard oral argument and issued a written opin-
ion. Plurality and per curium opinions meeting these criteria are 
included. 1" 
K A "Natural Court" is one which there are no personnel changes. See EPSTEIN. 
SEGAL. SPAETH & WALKER. THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA. DECISIONS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 305 (1\l\!4). The last Rehnquist Natural Court ran from 1\l\!4 to 
2005. and was comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens. O'Connor. 
Scalia. Kennedy. Thomas, Souter. Ginsburg and Breyer. 
Y. Spaeth's coding rules are available in the AllCourts codebook at 
http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerprojectlallcourt_codebook.pdf (hereinafter, Spaeth 
Code book). 
10. The resulting dataset. as used for this project. is available from the author at 
http://www.uky.edu/Law/faculty/ringhand.html. Add!lional alterations to the Spaeth data 
include the imposition of certain filters necessary to avoid the double or triple counting 
of certain types of cases. A full explanation of the filters and coding conventions used in 
this analysis also ts available at the above referenced website. The only significant sub-
stantive change made to the Spaeth databases involved changing a coding choice made 
by Spaeth that resulted in some cases arising under the II th Amendment or section 5 of 
the 14th Amendment being coded as raising questions of state level judicial review. even 
though the justices in these cases actually considered the constitutionally of a federal 
statute. I changed this coding to retlect that the legally relevant decision m these cases 
involved the constitutionality of the federal. not the state. statute. Obviously. the inclu-
sion. exclusion, and classification of types of cases can yield marginally different results in 
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I. FEDERAL LAWS AND DECLARATIONS OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
A. USE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO INVALIDATE 
FEDERAL LAW 
The conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court, individu-
ally and as a group, cast notably more votes to declare federal 
statutes unconstitutional than did their more liberal counter-
parts.11 Within the cases examined, Justice Thomas cast the most 
votes, 34, to declare a federal law unconstitutional. Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia were next, with 31 and 30 federal invalidation 
votes, respectively. The remaining conservative justices, Justices 
Rehnquist and O'Connor, followed with 25 and 24 such votes. 
The liberal justices, on the other hand, cast the fewest such 
votes: Justice Souter cast only 21 votes to overturn federal legis-
lation, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens cast 17 such votes, and Jus-
tice Breyer cast only 14: 12 
studies like this; the trends. however. do not change. See. for example, SEGAL & SPAETH. 
supra note 5 at 415. and Stefanic A. Lindquist and Rorie Spill Solberg, "Judicial Review 
hy the Rehnquist Court: Explaining Justices' Responses to Constitutional Challenges", 
forthcoming in POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY (each of which report trends identi-
cal to those identified here). 
11. Political scientists have developed a variety of scales by which to measure the 
relative liberalism and conservativism of Supreme Court justices. See Andrew D. Martin. 
Kevin M. Quinn, & Lee Epstein. The Me(/ian Justice on the United States Supreme Court. 
~3 KC. L. REV. 1275 (2005). These various methods generally concur with our intuitive 
sense of the justices' relative ideology. For example, based on the most recently devel-
oped of these models. the Martin Quinn scale, the relative ideology of the Rehnquist 
Natural Court justices in 2002 was as follows, with the most conservative justices listed 
first: Thomas. Scalia. Rehnquist. Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer. Ginsburg and Ste-
vens (based on 2002 Martin Quinn scores as reported in The Median Justice). 
12. A list of the cases in which each justice cast his or her federal invalidation votes 
is available at Appendix A. For each such case, Appendix A lists the case name, the case 
citation, the issue area of the decision. the term in which the case was decided, the vote 
margin by which the case was decided and the ideological direction of the justice's invali-
dation vote. 
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Table 1 
Justice Votes to Declare a Federal Statute Unconstitutional 
Thomas 34 
Kenned_y_ 31 
Scalia 30 
Rehnquist 25 
O'Connor 24 
Souter 21 
Ginsbur_g_ 17 
Stevens 17 
Bre_y_er 14 
Obviously, the conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court 
were much more likely than their liberal counterparts to vote to 
declare federal statutes unconstitutional. Each of the conserva-
tive justices voted to invalidate more federal laws on constitu-
tional grounds than did each of the liberal justices, with Justices 
Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia voting to do so in more than twice 
as many cases as did Justice Breyer. Plainly, judicial conservativ-
ism, at least as actually practiced by the justices of the Rehnquist 
Court, cannot be associated with the institutionally conservative 
value of judicial deference: the most conservative justices on the 
Rehnquist Court also were the justices most likely to use their 
power of judicial review to invalidate federal legislation." 
B. ISSUE AREAS IN WHICH THE JUSTICES VOTED TO 
!NV ALI DATE FEDERAL LAWS 
The conservative and the liberal justices also differed in the 
issue areas in which they cast their votes to invalidate federal 
13. Archibald Cox discussed this fusion of conservativism and judicial restraint, and 
the tension it would eventually create, in 19H7. when he wrote that "[T]he ranks of the 
conservative policy-oriented critics have been greatly strengthened by institutional critics 
of excessive judicial activism. The conservatives on the political axis who might be judi-
cial activists if they were in the saddle and the true advocates of strong judicial restraint 
can join hands in damning creative decisions of a liberal cast." Archibald Cox, The Role of' 
the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Sel{Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 11H. 129 (19H7). See 
aLw Maltz, supra note 6 at 632-33, 635; and text accompanying supra notes 1 and 4. 
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legislation. The Supreme Court Databases assign each justice's 
vote a discrete issue area (coded as "values"). These issue areas 
are as follows: criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, 
due process, federalism and federal taxation. The criminal pro-
cedure area includes cases involving the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants. 14 The civil rights area includes cases raising 
issues of voting rights; Fourteenth Amendment rights; affirma-
tive action; discrimination claims based on race, sex, sexuality 
and disability; assertions of welfare rights; and cases raising is-
sues involving immigration and naturalization. 1' The First 
Amendment area includes cases raising freedom of speech or re-
ligion claims, including campaign finance cases, commercial 
speech cases, and pornography and obscenity cases. 1" The due 
process area includes procedural due process and Takings 
Clause cases. 17 The federalism area includes cases raising consti-
tutional questions about the relative scope of national and state 
power, including Tenth and Eleventh Amendment cases, Com-
merce Clause cases, and-as recoded for this paper-cases aris-
ing under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1" The feder-
alism category does not include cases decided on the basis of 
federal statutory preemption. 1" The final issue area, federal taxa-
tion, includes only one case that appears in the analysis pre-
sented here: United States v. United States Shoe Corporation, in 
which Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, struck 
down the Harbor Maintenance Tax as violating the Export 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 2" There also is a "miscellane-
ous" code for cases not falling into any of these categories. 21 
As shown below, the conservative justices cast most of their 
federal invalidation votes in First Amendment cases, followed by 
federalism cases. In contrast, the liberal justices cast their federal 
invalidation votes overwhelmingly in First Amendment cases: 22 
P. Spaeth Codcbook. supra note 10 at.:15-47. 
15. ld 
16. "'-
17. "'-
1 H. !d. See also, supra note 11. 
19. !d. 
20. 523 U.S 360 (199H). 
21. !d. The one "miscellaneous" case in the federal invalidations data presented 
here is Plaut v. Spendthnft Farm. Inc .. 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (holding by a 7 to 2 vote that a 
federal statute requiring federal courts to reopen final judgments entered in private civil 
actions violated separation of powers principles embodied in Article III of the U.S. Con-
stitution) 
22. The Spaeth coding protocols code the issues listed here as "values". The value 
variable is determined by clustering numerous sub-issues into larger categones. For a full 
explanation of the content of each of these issues areas. see Spaeth Codebook. supra 
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Table 2 
Crim Civil 1st Due Federal- Fed Mise Total 
Pro Rights Am Process ism Tax 
Thomas 2 0 15 2 13 1 1 34 
Kennedy 1 0 15 2 11 1 1 31 
Scalia 1 0 13 2 12 1 1 30 
Rehn_guist 1 0 9 2 11 1 1 25 
O'Connor 1 0 9 2 10 1 1 24 
Souter 3 0 14 2 0 1 1 21 
Ginsburg 3 0 11 2 0 1 0 17 
Stevens 3 0 12 1 0 1 0 17 
Breyer 2 0 8 2 0 1 1 14 
The most significant area of disagreement between the lib-
eral and conservative justices clearly is the federalism cases. 21 In 
those cases, conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia cast 13 and 
12 votes, respectively, to invalidate federal legislation; their fel-
low conservatives Justices Kennedy and Rehnquist each cast 11 
such votes; and Justice O'Connor cast 10. 24 The liberal members 
note 10 at 19-20. 
23. Cases included in this area include Commerce Clause cases, such as United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). in which the Court imposed new limits on Con-
gress's ability to regulate interstate commerce. and lOth Amendment cases, such as 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. H9H (1997). in which the Court limited Congress's ability 
to govern the states as states. Also included are cases. such as Alabama v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356 (2001), limiting Congress's power to legislate under section 5 of the 14th 
Amendment. and 11th Amendment cases. such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996). expanding the doctrine of state sovereign immunity and restricting 
Congress's power to abrogate that immunity. 
24. The three federalism cases in which Justice Thomas voted to invalidate a fed-
eral law but Justice O'Connor did not were: Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, 53H U.S. 721 (2003) (holding. over the dissent of Justices Thomas, Scalia and 
Kennedy, that the 11th Amendment did not bar state employees from recovering money 
damages in federal court in the event of the state's failure to comply with the family-care 
provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act); Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. 
Hood. 541 U.S. 440 (2004) (holding. over the dissent of Justices Thomas and Scalia. that 
a federal bankruptcy court's discharge proceeding involving a student loan was not a suit 
against the state prohibited by the 11th Amendment); and Tennessee v. Lane. 541 U.S. 
50<J (2004) (holding. over the dissent of Justices Rehnquist. Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia. 
that Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases implicating the fundamental right of access 
to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' enforcement power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment). The replacement of Justice O'Connor with Justice Samuel 
Alito may mean that the issue raised in these cases will constitute the new front in the 
Court's federalism battles. 
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of the Rehnquist Court cast no federal invalidation votes in this 
area. 
That the conservative justices are more active than their lib-
eral counterparts in the federalism cases is not surprising; the 
Rehnquist Court's "federalist revolution" has been discussed 
widely in the legal and political science literature. 2' Interestingly, 
however, while the federalism cases were the area of greatest 
disagreement between the liberal and conservative justices, this 
was not the issue area in which most of the Rehnquist Court's 
conservative justices' federal invalidation votes were cast. 
Rather, with the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the most 
conservative justices on that Court (Justices Thomas and Scalia) 
cast more of their federal invalidation votes in First Amendment 
cases than in federalism cases. In fact, even if the federalism 
cases are removed from analysis, Justices Thomas, Kennedy and 
Scalia still voted to invalidate more federal laws than did Justices 
Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer.2" 
The votes of the conservative justices in these First 
Amendment cases are interesting, because they are somewhat of 
a poor fit with the method of constitutional interpretation 
( originalism or original meaning originalism) purportedly pre-
ferred by the Rehnquist Court's most conservative justices. Jus-
tice Thomas, for example, is one of the Rehnquist Court's 
strongest proponents of original meaning interpretivism.27 Yet of 
the nine First Amendment cases in which Justice Thomas voted 
to invalidate a federal law and Justice Breyer (the justice with 
the fewest federal invalidation votes) did not, three involved 
campaign finance regulation2", three involved commercial 
25. See. for example. Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller. The Three Faces of 
Federalism: An Empirical Asses.mum of Supreme Cmm Federalism Juri.1prwlence. 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000): Charles Tiefer. The Eleventh Amendment, Federalism. and Ju-
dicial Auivism: Questions aiJ(l Answers: Helping Those Who Can Help Themselves: The 
Rehnquist Court's Direu and lndireu Conservative Activism, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 
103 (2002): Calvin Massey, Federalism ami the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 
(2002): J. Mitchell Pickerill. Leveraging Federalism: The Real Meaning of the Rehnquist 
Court's Federalism Jurisprudence for States, 66 ALB. L. REV. H23 (2003). 
2o. This belies the assertion. frequently heard in discussions of the Rehnquist 
Court. that the more conservative justices on that Court were not truly "activist" because 
their federal invalidation decisions merely shifted authority from the Congress to state 
legislatures. rather than removing any particular policy choice from the realm of democ-
ratic decisionmaking. 
27. G. Edward White, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. 43-44. available at 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publications/art53. 
2H. Federal Election Com'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Cmt., 533 U.S. 
431 (2001 ): Federal Election Com'n v. Beaumont. 53'! U.S. 146 (2003): and McConnell v. 
Federal Election Com'n. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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speech2y and one involved the Federal Communication Carriers 
"must carry" rules for broadcasters-areas not readily impli-
cated under an originalist understanding of the First Amend-
ment.'" Thus, whatever the merits of the conservative justices' 
invalidation votes in these cases, it is far from obvious that such 
votes can be justified by reference to the original meaning of the 
First Amendment, which most scholars agree is- at best-
indeterminate or unhelpful in such cases.' 1 
None of this, of course, shows that the conservative justices 
on the Rehnquist Court were more "activist" than their liberal 
counterparts in First Amendment cases. Liberal Justice Souter 
joined the more conservative justices in voting to invalidate fed-
eral laws in many of these cases, and the other liberal justices 
also cast some similar votes. The point, rather, is two-fold: 1) it is 
inaccurate to attribute the conservative justices' high number of 
29. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc .. 521 U.S. 457 (1997): U.S. v. United 
Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001 ); and Thompson v. Western States Medical Center. 535 
U.S. 357 (2002). 
30. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C.. 520 U.S. 180 (1997). Of the remain-
ing two cases. one involved the religion clause (City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997)) and one was a complex case in which Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion advo-
cated invalidating the statute while nonetheless imposing fewer protections for porno-
graphic material than did the majority opinion upholding the statute (U.S. v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)). 
31. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-10 (2nd ed 2003) 
(noting that historical evidence regarding the intended meaning of the First Amendment 
is "ambiguous" and "unclear"): Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA. A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 124 (1997) (noting that the meaning of the First Amend-
ment at the time of its enactment was much more contested than it is now). This is true 
even among the most conservative scholars. Robert Bark, for example, has argued that 
the original meaning of the constitution would strip all but explicit, "non dangerous" po-
litical speech of First Amendment protection. See Robert H. Bark, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) (as cited in DANIEL A. 
FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY 25-36 (2002)). Jus-
tice Scalia, a vigorous proponent of originalism as a method of constitutional interpreta-
tion, also has acknowledged that the original meaning of the First Amendment is of little 
value in deciding many First Amendment cases. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island. 
517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(as cited in Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Founda-
tions of American Constitutionalism, 116 YALE L.J. 139, 146-47 (2006). Justice Scalia in 
44 Liquormart calls for more research on federal and local practices at the time of the 
adoption of the First Amendment. It is far from clear. however, that such research would 
yield results justifying more protection. See Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech 
from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34 AKRON L. REV. 231 (2000) (tracing the long history 
of the repression of speech by the states). This is perhaps particularly true in regard to 
the commercial speech doctrine-the constitutional protection of commercial speech has 
little historic pedigree and was not constitutionally protected at all until 1976. See C. 
Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Qucm-
dary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004); and Alan Morrison, How We Got the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist's Recollections, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV.1189 (2004). 
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federal invalidation votes primarily to federalism cases; and 2) 
the most conservative justices' high level of activity in this area is 
not readily reconcilable with their preferred method of constitu-
tional interpretation. While Justices Scalia and Thomas may use 
originalist reasoning to reject extending rights in some areas, 
they do not appear to impose the same constraint on their use of 
judicial power in these First Amendment cases.'2 
C. IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF THE JUSTICES' VOTES TO 
INVALIDATE FEDERAL LAWS 
Both the conservative and the liberal justices of the 
Rehnquist Court appear to have used their power to invalidate 
federal laws in ideologically predictable ways. The Supreme 
Court Databases assign each individual justice's vote a "direc-
tion'' variable of either liberal or conservative. In cases involving 
criminal procedure, civil rights, the First Amendment, and due 
process, a liberal vote is one in favor of a person accused or con-
~icted of a cri~e, ~ person assert.ing a civ.il ri&hts claim, or .a vote 
m favor of an md1gent or Amencan Indian. Votes favonng af-
firmative action, religious neutrality, campaign finance regula-
tion, and abortion rights also are coded as liberal, as are votes 
supporting the government in Takings Clause cases.'4 In issues 
pertaining to unions and economic activity, votes that are pro-
union, pro-liability, pro-injured person, pro-consumer, anti-
business, or anti-employer are coded as liberal.'' In each of these 
issue areas, votes not meeting these criteria are coded as conser-
. ln 
vat1ve. 
32. When originalist justices discuss original meaning in First Amendment cases. 
they tend to do so at a much higher level of generalization than when applying that inter-
pretive theory in other cases. Compare. for example. Justice Kennedy's concurring opin-
ion. joined by Justice Scalia. in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Cmt.. v. FEC 
(striking down a campaign spending regulation and expounding that "The First Amend-
ment embodies a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust. and wide-open" (citing New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan. 376 U.S. 254.270 (1964)). 514 U.S. 604, 629 (1996). with Justice Scalia's dissenting 
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas. arguing that the Constitution does not protect consensual. 
adult gay sex from criminal prosecution because "[s]odomy was a criminal offense at 
common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they ratified 
the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. all but 5 of the 
37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws" 539 U.S. 558,596 (2003) (citing Bower.1· 
v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
33. See Spaeth Codebook, supra note 10 at 57-60. 
34. "' 
35. "' 
36. "' 
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Using this coding methodology, the direction of each jus-
tice's votes in the cases in which that justice voted to declare a 
federal law unconstitutional was as follows: 
Table 3 
Conservative Liberal Uncoded Total 
Votes Votes Votes n Votes 
Thomas 22 11 1 34 
Kennedy 17 13 1 31 
Scalia 21 8 1 30 
Rehnquist 17 7 1 25 
O'Connor 14 9 1 24 
Souter 2 18 1 21 
Ginsburg 3 14 0 17 
Stevens 1 16 0 17 
Breyer 2 11 1 14 
As shown above, the majority of the votes cast by the con-
servative justices were conservative and the majority of the votes 
cast by the liberal justices were liberal. Conservative Justices 
Scalia and Thomas each cast more than 20 conservative invalida-
tion votes, but only 8 (Justice Scalia) and 11 (Justice Thomas) 
liberal invalidation votes. Justice Souter, on the other hand, cast 
18 liberal invalidation votes and only two conservative invalida-
tion votes, while Justice Stevens cast 16 liberal votes and only 
. '" one conservative vote. 
This raises two interesting points. First, both the liberal and 
the conservative justices on the Rehnquist Court appear to have 
used their federal level judicial review power primarily to further 
their ideologically preferred results. In other words, the conser-
vative justices, just like their liberal counterparts, advanced their 
presumptively preferred substantive outcomes not by deferring 
37. Seven of the justices' federal invalidation votes were deemed by Spaeth to be 
ideologically uncodable, meaning they did not comply with either the liberal or the con-
servative coding rules for their issue area. 
3R. As noted above. political scientists have extensively examined the extent to 
which Supreme Court justices vote in accordance with their ideological preferences. See 
supra note 5. 
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to legislative policy choices, but by using their power of judicial 
review to supplant those choices. Second, the conservative jus-
tices nonetheless appeared more willing than their liberal coun-
terparts to vote against their presumed ideological preference, at 
least when casting their federal invalidation votes. For example, 
more than 33 percent of Justice Thomas's ideologically coded 
federal invalidation votes appear to have been cast in further-
ance of liberal outcomes, while only 10 percent of Justice 
Souter's votes were cast in favor of conservative outcomes. 
A closer examination of the underlying cases, however, 
shows that this observation is somewhat misleading. A coding 
rule used in compiling the Supreme Court Databases codes most 
First Amendment cases as "liberal" whenever the constitutional 
claimant wins. This means that several types of First Amend-
ment cases, such as cases involving commercial speech and cam-
paign finance regulations, yield ideological direction codes not 
necessarily consistent with today's political preferences.'~ This in 
turn results in the high rate of "liberal" invalidation tallies of the 
Rehnquist Court's most conservative justices. 
Looking at the ideological direction of the justices' federal 
invalidation votes in reference to the issue areas in which they 
were cast shows the effect of this First Amendment coding 
choice on the data. The chart below shows the ideological direc-
tion, by issue area, of the justices' federal invalidation votes. The 
fourth column of Table 4 shows the effect of re-coding as con-
servative votes to invalidate statutes in commercial speech and 
campaign finance cases. Table 5 shows the effect of this recoding 
on the ideological orientation of each justice's invalidation votes 
(conservative votes are listed first): 
39. For a discussion of the impact of this coding rule, see Lori A. Ringhand, The 
Rehnquisc Court: A "By-che-Numhers" Recrospeuive, forthcoming Spring 2007 in the 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
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Table 4 
Criminal First 1st Am Due Federal- Federal 
Pro Am Recoded Process Ism Tax 
Thomas 111 5110 1114 2/0 13/0 1/0 
Kennedy 011 3/12 817 2/0 11/0 110 
Scalia 1/0 5/8 1112 2/0 12/0 110 
Rehnquist 011 3/6 7/2 2/0 11/0 1/0 
O'Connor 011 1/8 5/4 2/0 12/0 1/0 
Souter 0/2 0115 7/8 111 0/0 110 
Ginsbu!]_ 0/3 1110 3/8 1/1 0/0 1/0 
Stevens 012 0/13 4/9 011 010 110 
Breyer 0/2 0/8 3/5 1/1 010 110 
Table 5 
Before Recoding After Recoding 
Thomas 22/11 28/5 
Kennedy 17113 22/8 
Scalia 21/8 27/2 
Rehnquist 17/7 21/3 
O'Connor 16/8 20/4 
Souter 2/18 9/11 
Ginsbur:g 3/14 5/12 
Stevens 1/16 5/12 
Breyer 2/11 5/8 
Clearly, when the ideological drift in the First Amendment 
cases is taken into account, it is evident that the Court's more 
conservative justices cast very few genuinely liberal federal in-
validation votes:" Of Justice Thomas's 11 purportedly liberal 
votes, six were cast in commercial speech or campaign finance 
cases, as were six of Justice Scalia's eight "liberal" votes. 
Thus, the re-coding of these cases illuminates the ideologi-
cally predictable nature of most of the justices' federal invalida-
tion votes. Conservative Justices Scalia and Thomas cast 93 and 
85 percent, respectively, of their ideologically coded federal in-
validation votes in furtherance of conservative outcomes; while 
40. See Appendix A. 
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liberal justices Ginsburg and Stevens each cast 70 percent of 
their votes in furtherance of liberal outcomes. Only Justices 
Souter and Breyer were somewhat less ideologically predictable. 
Only 55 percent of Justice Souter's ideologically coded federal 
invalidation votes were liberal, while only 61 percent of Justice 
Breyer's were. Even this meager diversity, however, is attribut-
able almost exclusively to ideologically elusive First Amendment 
cases. 
STATE LAWS AND DECLARATIONS OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
A. USE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO INVALIDATE STATE LAWS 
The state cases present a different picture. Unlike in the 
federal invalidation cases, in these cases it is the liberal justices 
who most actively used their power. As shown below, Justice 
Stevens voted to invalidate the most state laws, casting 46 such 
votes." He is followed by Justices Souter and Breyer, with 45 
and 44 state invalidation votes respectively, and Justice Gins-
burg, with 41. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are next, with 39 
and 36 votes each, followed by Justices Scalia and Thomas with 
27 votes each. Justice Rehnquist cast the fewest votes to invali-
date state legislation, with 21-less than half as many such votes 
as cast by Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer: 
41. A list of the cases in which each justice cast his or her state invalidation votes is 
available at Appendix B. For each such case. Appendix B lists the case name. the case 
citation, the issue area of the case. the term in which the case was decided. the vote mar-
gin by which the case was decided and the ideological direction of the justice's invalida-
tion vote. 
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Table 6 
Justice Votes to declare a state law 
unconstitutional 
Stevens 46 
Souter 45 
Breyer 44 
Ginsburg 41 
O'Connor 39 
Kennedy 36 
Scalia 27 
Thomas 27 
Rehf!_guist 21 
Clearly, the Rehnquist Court justices generally regarded as 
the most conservative (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Scalia and Thomas) were far more reticent to invalidate state 
laws than were their more liberal counterparts. This is consistent 
with the pro-states' rights, pro-federalism perspective frequently 
associated with these justices. Again, however, the more inter-
esting thing about these cases may be how- not whether- the 
various justices used their power. 
B. ISSUE AREAS IN WHICH THE JUSTICES VOTED TO 
!NY ALI DATE STATE LAWS 
As in the federal invalidation cases, the liberal and the con-
servative justices used their power in these state-level cases quite 
differently: 
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Table 7 
Crim Civil 1st Due Privacy Economic Federal- Total 
Pro Rights Am Proc Activity ism 
Stevens 11 7 11 4 4 7 2 46 
Souter 8 7 11 4 5 7 3 45 
Breyer 9 7 8 4 4 8 4 44 
Ginsburg 9 7 10 3 5 5 2 41 
O'Connor 4 9 7 4 5 7 3 39 
Kennedy 4 9 9 3 2 6 3 36 
Scalia 2 7 7 3 1 6 1 27 
Thomas 2 6 8 3 2 5 1 27 
Rehnquist 1 6 4 3 1 4 2 21 
As shown above, the areas of most disagreement between 
the liberal and conservative justices were criminal procedure and 
the First Amendment. In both of those issue areas, the liberal 
justices voted to invalidate far more statutes than did their more 
conservative counterparts. The criminal procedure cases in 
which these votes were cast varied, and included two death pen-
alty challenges, numerous challenges under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, and a challenge to California's "three strikes" statute:2 
Within the First Amendment cases, some of the conservative jus-
tices invalidation votes, as discussed above, came in commercial 
speech and campaign regulation cases.41 The Court's more liberal 
justices also cast invalidation votes in these types of cases, with 
much of the difference being made up in pornography and Es-
tablishment Clause cases.44 
The other key area of difference between the justices in the 
state invalidation cases is the Civil Rights cases. While the jus-
tices cast a roughly similar number of votes to invalidate state 
legislation in this area, they did so in very different cases, and 
their votes furthered different ideological outcomes. Of the Civil 
Rights invalidation votes cast by the Court's most conservative 
justices (Justices Thomas and Scalia), three involved Fourteenth 
42. See Appendix B. 
43. /d. 
44. /d. 
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Amendment-based "racial gerrymandering" challenges to legis-
lative redistricting plans4' and the fourth struck down an effort 
by Hawaii to reserve spots on a governing board to native born 
Hawaiians:" None of the Court's liberal justices cast any of their 
state level invalidation votes in these types of cases.47 
These Fourteenth Amendment votes are striking because, 
like the First Amendment cases discussed above, they also rest 
on somewhat questionable originalism grounds. Whether the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause compels striking down the legislative redistricting 
plans at issue in these cases is far from clear4~, and does not seem 
to be relied on by those justices in these cases. 4~ As in the federal 
level cases, it thus appears that the Rehnquist Court's most con-
servative justices were willing to use their power to invalidate 
state laws in ways not clearly mandated by an originalist inter-
pretation of the Constitution. 
C. IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF THE JUSTICES' VOTES TO 
!NV ALIDATE FEDERAL LAWS 
The justices' state invalidation votes, listed by the issue ar-
eas in which they were cast, were as follows (conservative votes 
within each issue area are listed first): 
45. Miller v. Johnson. 515 U.S. 400 (1445); Shaw v. Hunt. 517 U.S. R<J9 (1496); and 
Bush v. Vera. 517 U.S. 952 (1 ')')6). 
46. Rice v. Cayetano. 52R U.S. 4')5 2000). 
47. See Appendix B. 
4R. See. e.g.. LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-22. at 
1523. n.<J (2d ed. 1 'JRR); Erwin Chemerinsky. The Rehnquist Court and Justice: An Oxv-
momn~. 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37.47 (1')')')); Daniel Lowenstein. You Don't Have io 
he a Lihera/to Hme the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 77') (1 ')')R) (cit-
ing Jeffrey Rosen. Kiryas .foe/ and Shaw v. Reno: A Text-Bound lnterpretivi.1t Approach. 
26 CUMB. L. REV. 3R7. 402-03 (1446)). 
4'). For a discussion of Justices Thomas' and Scalia's silence on this issue. see Mi-
chael Selmi. The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Auion Retrospeuive. R7 GEO. L.J. <JRI. 
1000. n. 113 (1')')')). See also. Eric Schnapper. Afjirmmive Auion and the Legislative His-
wry of the Fourteenth Amendment. 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1 <JRS). 
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Table 8 
Crim Civil 1st Due Privacy Economic Feder- Total 
Pro Rights Am Proc Activit/' alism 
Stevens 0/11 017 1110 0/4 0/4 6/1 0/2 7/39 
Souter 0/8 116 1110 0/4 015 5/2 0/3 7/38 
Breyer 0/9 1/6 1/7 0/4 0/4 6/2 0/4 8/36 
Ginsburg 0/9 017 119 0/3 015 4/1 0/2 5/36 
O'Connor 0/4 4/5 017 1/3 0/5 6/1 0/3 11/28 
Kennedy 0/4 4/5 1/8 112 0/2 4/2 0/3 10/26 
Scalia 0/2 4/3 2/5 2/1 011 5/1 0/1 13/14 
Thomas 0/2 4/2 2/6 2/1 0/2 510 011 13/14 
Rehnquist 011 4/2 113 2/1 0/1 4/0 012 11/10 
As shown above, liberal justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and 
Ginsburg each cast most of their state invalidation votes in fur-
therance of substantively liberal outcomes. Conservative justices 
Scalia, Thomas and Rehnquist, in comparison, each cast an al-
most equal number of conservative and liberal state invalidation 
votes. Moderate justices O'Connor and Kennedy, not surpris-
ingly, fell roughly in-between these two ideological blocs, cast an 
almost even number of liberal and conservative state invalida-
tion votes in this issue area.'1 
50. The constitutional cases in the economic activity category consist primarily of 
Dormant Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunity Clause cases. In economic ac-
tivity cases. the Spaeth coding protocols deem votes to invalidate state taxation schemes 
"pro-business". Such votes therefore are coded as conservative. See Spaeth Codebook. 
supra note 10 at 5H-59. This does not. however, mean that all cases striking down state 
legislation under the Dormant Commerce Clause are coded as conservative. For exam-
ple. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). invaliding a state taxation scheme un-
der the Dormant Commerce Clause, is coded as a conservative outcome, but Camps 
NewjimmUO Wawnna (infra note 51), invalidating a state law exempting charitable or-
ganizations from state property tax. is coded as a liberal. 
51. The state invalidation cases in which the conservative-centrists justices, Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy, deviate from the conservative block are interesting. For exam-
ple. both of these justices voted with their more liberal counterparts in Romer v. Evans. 
517 U.S. 620 (19lJ6), to strike down an amendment to the Colorado constitution that pro-
hibited the state from enacting via regular legislation laws designed to prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of homosexual or bisexual orientation. They also both voted with the 
more liberal justices in M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996), to strike down a Mississippi 
statute that conditioned a person's right to appeal certain judicial decisions on prepay-
ment of fees: in Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) to strike down under the 
Fourth Amendment a city ordinance establishing vehicle checkpoints solely for the pur-
2007] JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 63 
What is perhaps more surprising than the difference be-
tween the liberal and conservative justices in this area is number 
of liberal outcomes, as shown above, that the most conservative 
justices did vote for when casting their state invalidation votes. 
Each of the most conservative justices cast close to half of their 
state invalidation votes in furtherance of liberal outcomes. Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, for example, each cast an even number 
of liberal and conservative state invalidation votes. Justice 
Rehnquist cast just two more conservative than liberal votes. 
These are much closer conservative/liberal invalidation vote 
ratios than we see for any of the liberal justices. Of the liberal 
justices, Justice Breyer had the highest conservative/liberal ratio, 
and he cast just 8 of his 44 invalidation votes in furtherance of 
conservative outcomes. Moreover, while some of the conserva-
tives justices liberal invalidation votes are attributable to the 
types of First Amendment cases discussed above, such cases play 
a much smaller role here than they do in the federal invalidation 
52 
cases. 
pose of intercepting illegal drugs: in Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 41 (1999) to strike 
down as unconstitutionally vague a Chicago law prohibiting criminal street gang mem· 
bers from loitering in public places: and in Camps Newfound/0 Watonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison. ME, 520 U.S. 564 (I 997) to strike down under the Dormant Commerce Clause 
a Maine law that exempted charitable organizations incorporated in Maine from state 
real estate and personal property taxes. Justice O'Connor dissented with the liberal jus-
tices in Montana v. Egelhoff. 5IH U.S. 37 (I 996). arguing that a Montana law that pre-
vented a defendant's intoxicated state from being used in his defense in a vehicular 
homicide case violated the defendant's constitutional right to a fair opportunity to defend 
himself: in Oklahoma Tax Com'n. v. Jefferson Lines. inc .. 514 U.S. 175 (1995). arguing in 
dissent with Justice Breyer that Oklahoma's tax on the gross price of interstate bus tick-
ets sold in Oklahoma violates the Dormant Commerce Clause and in Stenberg v. 
Carhart. 530 U.S. 914 (2000) to invalidate a Nebraska statute that banned "partial birth 
abortions" without providing an exception for the preservation of the mother's health. 
She also dissented, again with Justice Breyer. in Jefferson County. Alabama v. Acker, 
527 U.S. 423 (I 999). arguing in that case that a county tax violated the intergovernmental 
tax immunity doctrine. Justice Kennedy voted with the more liberal justices in U.S. Term 
Limits. Inc. v. Thornton. 514 U.S. 779 (I '195) to strike down an Arkansas term limits law; 
he also voted in dissent with Justice Stevens in Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Re-
porting Publishing. Corp., 52H U.S. 32 (I 99H) (arguing that a state law prohibiting there-
lease to commercial entittes information regarding names and addresses of recently ar-
rested individuals violated the First Amendment). 
52. Only three of the state-level invalidation votes cast by Justices Thomas or Scalia 
in the First Amendment area involved commercial speech or campaign finance regula-
tion: 44 Liquormart. Inc. v. Rhode Island. 517 U.S. 4H4 (1996): Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC. 52H US. 377 (2000) and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly. 533 U.S. 525 
(2001). 
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III. OVERTURNING PRECEDENT'' 
The preceding sections examined the willingness of individ-
ual justices to invalidate state and federal legislation. An alterna-
tive way of measuring "judicial activism" is by considering a jus-
tice's willingness to overturn existing precedent. Using votes to 
overturn precedent as a measure of judicial activism is contro-
versial. Votes to overturn precedent are qualitatively different 
than votes to invalidate federal or state legislation. A vote to in-
validate federal or state legislation measures a justice's willing-
ness to use his or her power in relation to duly elected legislative 
bodies. A vote to overturn precedent measures a justice's use of 
his or her power in relation to prior courts. This is a noteworthy 
distinction, and different institutional implications are raised by 
each scenario. 
I opt to include this information nonetheless for two rea-
sons. First, the use of judicial power to overturn precedent has at 
least some of the same qualities that the use of judicial review to 
invalidate federal or state legislation does-in both cases, for ex-
ample, the Court undeniably uses its judicial power to change 
existing law. Second, many legal scholars incorporate this meas-
ure into their own assessments of judicial activism. '4 The inclu-
sion of the information here will be useful for scholars taking 
h " that approac . 
The Supreme Court Databases code each justice's votes to 
formally overturn precedent. A vote will be recorded as a vote to 
overturn precedent when a justice writes or joins an opinion stat-
ing that an existing Supreme Court precedent is or should be 
overruled, or when a dissenting justice persuasively argues that 
the majority is in fact overturning a precedent.'~ Cases in which a 
justice distinguishes an existing precedent from the case at bar 
are not counted as votes to overturn precedent.'7 
As measured by their relative willingness to overturn prece-
dent, there is no doubt that the conservative members of the 
53. Unlike the data in the preceding sections. the data regarding the individual jus-
tices' votes to overturn precedent extend only through the Court's 2000 term. 
54. See. for example, Keenan D. Kmiec. The Origin and Current Meanings of "Ju-
dicial Activism. 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441. 1466-69 (2004). 
55. See Canon. supra note 3 at 241 (noting that critics of the Warren Court often 
attacked it as activist for its "unwillingness to maintain continuity, precedent or 'neutral 
principles'". See also Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1787, 1789 (2005). 
56. See Spaeth Codebook, supra note 10 at 64. 
57. /d. 
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Rehnquist Natural Court were more "activist" than the liberal 
members:;x 
Table 9 
Justice 
Votes to Overturn 
Precedent 
Thomas 23 
Scalia 19 
Kennedy 16 
Rehnquist 12 
O'Connor 12 
Breyer 10 
Stevens 9 
Ginsburg 8 
Souter 7 
As we can see, Justice Thomas outstrips even his conserva-
tive colleagues in this area. He cast the most votes- 23- to in-
validate precedent. This is more than three times as many as Jus-
tice Souter, who has cast the fewest such votes (7). 
The exception to these high numbers among the more con-
servative justices is, again, Justice Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist 
voted to overturn only 12 precedents. This put him closer to the 
conservative-leaning centrists Justices Kennedy and O'Connor 
than to his more solidly conservative colleagues Justices Thomas 
and Scalia. In fact, Justice Rehnquist's record on this point is 
closer to that of all four of the liberal justices than it is to Justice 
Thomas's. As in the state invalidation cases, we again see Justice 
Rehnquist engaged in a more restrained type of conservative ju-
risprudence than is apparent in the voting records of Justices 
Thomas and Scalia. 
58. A list of the cases in which each justice cast his or her votes to overturn prece-
dent is available at Appendix C. For each such case. Appendix C lists the case name, the 
case citation, the issue area of the case, the term in which the case was decided. the vote 
margin by which the case was decided and the ideological direction of the justice's invali-
dation vote. 
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The issue areas and ideological direction of the justices' 
votes to overturn precedent also differed, and are as follows 
(conservative votes within each issue area are listed first): 
Table 10 
Crim Civ 1st Due Priv Econ Jud Feder- Total 
Pro Rgts Am Proc Act Pw alism 
Thomas 4/2 2/0 4/2 1/0 110 1/1 0/1 3/1 16/7 
Scalia 3/2 210 4/1 110 1/0 0/1 0/1 3/0 14/5 
Kennedy 2/3 1/0 4/1 1/0 0 0/1 011 2/0 10/6 
Rehnquist 1/1 1/0 2/1 110 1/0 0/1 0/1 2/0 8/4 
O'Connor 1/1 110 2/1 110 0 0/1 0/2 2/0 7/5 
Breyer 0/4 0/1 1/1 0 0 0/1 0/2 0 119 
Stevens 0/3 011 0/2 0 0 0/1 0/2 0 019 
Ginsburg 013 0/1 0/2 0 0 0/1 011 0 0/8 
Souter 0/2 0/1 0/2 0 0 0/1 011 0 017 
As shown above the justices' votes to overturn ex1stmg 
precedents appear to be quite ideologically predictable. Justice 
Thomas cast 69 percent of his votes to overturn precedent in fur-
therance of a conservative case outcome, while 73 percent of 
Justice Scalia's votes to overturn precedent were ideologically 
conservative. The liberal justices were even more ideologically 
consistent in this area. Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg 
each cast a full 100 percent of their votes here in furtherance of a 
liberal outcome, with Justice Breyer trailing just behind at 90 
percent. 
CONCLUSION 
"Judicial activism" is, and is likely to remain, a deeply con-
tested term. This paper has attempted to give the term some 
quantifiable meaning by defining it in three objectively verifiable 
ways: a justice's willingness to invalidate federal legislation, to 
invalidate state legislation, and to overturn precedent. Using 
these measures of judicial activism-the only such measures not 
resting on fundamentally contested theories of constitutional in-
terpretation-we see that the "judicial conservatives" sitting on 
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the Rehnquist Court were in many ways more "activist" than 
their more "liberal" counterparts. Although the liberal justices 
invalidated more state laws than did the conservative justices, 
the conservatives were much more willing to invalidate federal 
laws and to overturn precedents than were their liberal counter-
parts. The cognizant difference between the justices, therefore, 
was not whether they engaged in such activism, but the issue ar-
eas in which they did so, the ideological direction their activism 
took, and the institutional levels at which it occurred. While this 
finding is consistent with current legal scholarship and thus not 
itself surprising, my hope is that this paper, by providing com-
prehensive and empirical data about actual judicial behavior, 
will contribute to the growing effort to steer constitutional 
scholarship away from abstract theories of judicial review and 
toward a more grounded understanding of the role judicial 
power and constitutional interpretation in fact play in our legal 
system. 
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APPENDIX A 
VOTES TO INVALIDATE FEDERAL LAWS 
Vnte 
Justice Rehnquist U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vnte Term 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm. Inc. 574 us 2/l miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 574 US. 476 amendment liberal 90 1994 
U.S. v. Lopez 5J.i US. 541J federalism conservative 54 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 577 us 44 federalism conservative 54 1995 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. Campaign first 
Cmt. v. FEC 578 us ()().f amendment liberal 72 1995 
Babbitt v. Youpee 5]1) us 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & first 
Elliott. Inc. 527 us. -!57 amendment liberal 54 1996 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 527 us 507 amendment conservative 63 1996 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 52/USS.J.f amendment liberal 90 1996 
Printz v. U.S. 521 US.lMi federalism conservative 54 1996 
US. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 us 3(J() taxation conservative 90 1997 
Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel 524 US. 41)/i due process conservative 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Ass'n. v. U.S. 527US/73 amendment liberal 90 1998 
Florida Prepaid v. 
College Sav. Bank 527 us ()27 federalism conservative 54 1998 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 U.S. oM federalism conservative 54 1998 
Alden v. Maine 527US. 700 federalism conservative 54 1998 
Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents 528 us ()2 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Morrison 521) US. 51)/i federalism conservative 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 us -+28 procedure liberal 72 1999 
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Board of Trustees 
of University of 
Alabama v. Garrett 531 us. 356 federalism conservative 54 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 us 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. first 
Campaign Cmt. 533 US. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
McConnell v. 
Federal Election first 
Com'n 540 US. <J3 amendment conservative 54 2003 
Tennessee v. Lane 541 US. 5119 federalism conservative 54 2003 
Gonzales v. Raich 545 US. 1 federalism conservative 63 2004 
Total 25 
Vote 
Justice Stevens U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vnte Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury first 
Employees Union 513 US. -154 amendment liberal n3 ]l)<J4 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 514 US. 476 amendment liberal LJO 1LJ'I4 
Denver Area Educ. 
Telcoms. Consor- first 
tium v. FCC 5/N US 727 amendment liberal 72 1 '1'10 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 521 us. 507 amendment liberal 63 19'16 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 5:!.1 US. 84-1 amendment liberal 90 ]l)<J6 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 us. 360 taxation conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
u.s. v. Bajakajian 52-1 us 321 procedure liberal 54 19'17 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast-
ing Ass'n, Inc. v. first 
u.s. 527 US. 173 amendment liberal l)() 1998 
U.S. v. Playboy 
Entertainment first 
Group, Inc. 52() US. 803 amendment liberal 54 1'1'1'1 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 us. 42/l procedure liberal 72 19'19 
Legal Services first 
Corp. v. Velazquez 531 US. 533 amendment liberal 54 2000 
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U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 U.S. 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
Dusenbery v. U.S. 534 u.s 1()1 due process liberal 54 2001 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 u.s. 234 amendment liberal 63 2001 
Ashcroft v. 
American Civil first 
Liberties Union 535 U.S 5M amendment liberal !:11 2001 
U.S. v. American first 
Library Ass'n, Inc. 539 u.s. 194 amendment liberal 63 2002 
Johanns v. Live-
stock Marketing first 
Ass'n 544 u.s. 5511 amendment liberal 63 2004 
Total 17 
Vote 
Justice O'Connur U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury Employ- first 
ees Union 513 u.s. -154 amendment liberal 63 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211 miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 514U.S.476 amendment liberal 90 1994 
U.S. v. Lopez 514 u.s. 549 federalism conservative 54 1994 
Seminole Tnbe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 u.s 4-1 federalism conservative 54 1995 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. Campaign first 
Cmt. v. FEC 518 u.s. 604 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Denver Area Educ. 
Telcoms. Consor- first 
tium v. FCC 518 US. 727 amendment liberal 72 1996 
Babbitt v. Youpee 519 us 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Turner Broadcast-
ing System. Inc. v. first 
F. C. C. 520 us 1811 amendment liberal 54 1996 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 u.s. 844 amendment liberal 90 1996 
Printz v. U.S. 521 us. 898 federalism conservative 54 1996 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 u.s 360 taxation conservative 90 1997 
Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel 524 US. 4<J8 due process conservative 54 1997 
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Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527U.S.J73 amendment liberal 90 1998 
Florida Prepaid v. 
College Sav. Bank 527 u.s ()27 federalism conservative 54 199H 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 U.S. Mn federalism conservative 54 199H 
Alden v. Maine 527U.S 70n federalism conservative 54 199H 
Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents 528 u.s n2 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Morrison 52<) u.s 5<)8 federalism conservative 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 U.S. 428 procedure liberal 72 1999 
Board of Trustees 
of University of 
Alabama v. Garrett 531 U.S. 35n federalism conservative 54 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 u.s. 405 amendment conservative 63 2000 
Thompson v. 
Western States first 
Medical Center 535 u.s 357 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. I federalism conservative 63 2004 
Total 24 
Vote 
Justice Scalia u.s_ Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. X-Citement first 
Video, Inc. 513 u.s (J4 amendment conservative 72 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211 miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 5J.I u.s 47() amendment liberal 90 1994 
U.S. v. Lopez 514 u.s. 54<) federalism conservative 54 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 u.s 44 federalism conservative 54 1995 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. 
Campaign Cmt. v. first 
FEC 5IH u.s. no4 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Babbitt v. Youpee 57<) u.s 234 due process conservative H1 1996 
Turner Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. first 
F.C.C. 520U.S.IHO amendment liberal 54 1996 
Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & first 
Elliott. Inc. 521U.S457 amendment liberal 54 1996 
72 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:43 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 521 US. 507 amendment conservative 63 1996 
Reno v. Amencan 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521US844 amendment liberal 90 1996 
Printz v. U.S. 521 US. R9/l federalism conservative 54 1996 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 US. 3n0 taxation conservative 90 1997 
Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel 524 US. 49/l due process conservative 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 US. 173 amendment liberal 90 199H 
Florida Prepaid v. 
College Sav. Bank 527 us 627 federalism conservative 54 1998 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 us(){]{) federalism conservative 54 199H 
Alden v. Maine 527 US. 70n federalism conservative 54 1998 
Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents 528 us {)2 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Morrison 529 US. 59/l federalism conservative 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 us ./28 procedure conservative 72 1999 
Board of Trustees 
of University of 
Alabama v. Garrett 531 US. 356 federalism conservative 54 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods. Inc. 533 US . .JIJ5 amendment liberal 63 2000 
FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. first 
Campaign Cmt. 533 US. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Thompson v. West-
ern States Medical first 
Center 535 us 357 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Nevada Dept. of 
Human Resources 
v. Hibbs 538 us 721 federalism conservative 63 2002 
Federal Election 
Com'n v. first 
Beaumont 539 us 14(J amendment conservative 72 2002 
McConnell v. 
Federal Election first 
Com'n 540 us. 93 amendment conservative 54 2003 
Tennessee Student 
Assistance Corp. v. 
Hood 541 us. .J4() federalism conservative 72 2003 
Tennessee v. Lane 541 US. 509 federalism conservative 54 2003 
Total 30 
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Vote 
Jus lice Kennedy U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury first 
Employees Union 513 us 45-1 amendment liberal 63 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 us 211 miscellaneous 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 51-Ius -17() amendment liberal 90 1994 
U.S. v. Lopez 514 us. 54'1 federalism conservative 54 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 US. -14 federalism conservative 54 1995 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. 
Campaign Cmt. v. first 
FEC 578 us (){14 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Denver Area Edu. 
Telecommunica- f1rst 
tions v. F.C.C. 518 U.'·; 7:'.7 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Babbitt v. Youpee 51'1 US. 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 5:'.1 us 51!7 amendment conservative ti3 199ti 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 US./!44 amendment liberal 90 19% 
Printz v. U.S. 521 us 81)8 federalism conservative 54 199ti 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 US. 300 taxation conservative 90 1997 
Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel 5]4 us 4<J8 due process conservative 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 us 173 amendment liberal 90 1998 
Florida Prepaid v. 
College Sav. Bank 527 us ()]7 federalism conservative 54 1998 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 us. ()6() federalism conservative 54 1998 
Alden v. Maine 527 us 7(}(J federalism conservative 54 1998 
Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents 5211 US. fl2 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Morrison 5]1) us 5<)8 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group. first 
Inc. 52'1 US. 803 amendment liberal 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. u.s. 5.W U.S -128 procedure liberal 72 1999 
74 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:43 
Board of Trustees 
of University of 
Alabama v. Garrett 531 U.S. 356 federalism conservative 54 2000 
Legal Services 
Corp. v. first 
Velazquez 531 U.S. 533 amendment liberal 54 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 u.s. 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. first 
Campaign Cmt. 533 U.S. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 u.s. 234 amendment liberal 63 2001 
Thompson v. West-
ern States Medical first 
Center 535 U.S. 357 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Nevada Dept. of 
Human Resources 
v. Hibbs 538 u.s. 721 federalism conservative 63 2002 
McConnell v. 
Federal Election first 
Com'n 5411 U.S. Y3 amendment conservative 54 2003 
Tennessee v. Lane 541 u.s. 509 federalism conservative 54 2003 
Johanns v. Live-
stock Marketing first 
Ass'n 544 U.S. 5511 amendment liberal 63 2004 
Total 31 
Vote 
Justice Souter U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury Employ- first 
ees Union 513 u.s 454 amendment liberal 63 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211 miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 514 u.s. 47() amendment liberal 90 1994 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. 
Campaign Cmt. v. first 
FEC 518 U.S. 604 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Denver Area Educ. 
Telcoms. Consor- first 
tium v. FCC 518 U.S. 727 amendment liberal 72 1996 
Babbitt v. Youpee 519 u.s. 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & first 
Elliott, Inc. 5:!1 U.S. 457 amendment liberal 54 1996 
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Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 u.s 844 amendment liberal 90 1996 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 u.s. 31i!l taxation conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
U.S. v. Bajakajian 524 U.S. 321 procedure liberal 54 1997 
National Endow-
ment for the Arts v. first 
Finley 5].1 u.s 5{jl) amendment liberal H1 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 u.s 173 amendment liberal 90 1998 
U.S. v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group. first 
Inc. 52!J U.S. 803 amendment liberal 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 U.S 42H procedure liberal 72 1999 
Legal Services 
Corp. v. first 
Velazquez 53! u.s 533 amendment liberal 54 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 u.s. 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
Dusenbery v. U.S. 53.J u.s f(JJ due process liberal 54 2001 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 u.s 234 amendment liberal 63 2001 
Thompson v. West-
ern States Medical first 
Center 535 u.s 357 amendment liberal 54 2001 
U.S. v. American first 
Library Ass'n, Inc. 5.19 U.S IY4 amendment liberal 63 2002 
Johanns v. Live-
stock Marketing first 
Ass'n 5.J4 u.s 5511 amendment liberal 63 2004 
Total 21 
Vote 
Justice Thom11s U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. X-Citement first 
Video, Inc. 513 u.s {j.J amendment conservative 72 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211 miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 5/.J u.s .J7() amendment liberal 90 1994 
U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S. 541J federalism conservative 54 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 u.s .J4 federalism conservative 54 1995 
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Colorado Republi-
can Fed. 
Campaign Cmt. v. first 
FEC 5Ui U.S. 604 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Babbitt v. Youpee 5/1) u.s. 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Turner Broadcast-
ing System. Inc. v. first 
F.C.C. 520 U.S IHO amendment liberal 54 1996 
Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & first 
Elliott. Inc. 511 u.s. 457 amendment liberal 54 1996 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 521 u.s. 507 amendment conservative 63 1996 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 U.S X44 amendment liberal 90 1996 
Printz v. U.S. 52/U.SH98 federalism conservative 54 1996 
U.S v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 513 us 360 taxation conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
U.S. v. Bajakajian 514 u.s. 321 procedure liberal 54 1997 
Eastern Enterprises 
v. Apfel 524 u.s 41)8 due process conservative 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 U.S. 173 amendment liberal 90 1998 
Florida Prepaid v. 
College Sav. Bank 517 U.S. 627 federalism conservative 54 1998 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 U.S. 666 federalism conservative 54 1998 
Alden v. Maine 527 us 70(J federalism conservative 54 1998 
Kimel v. Florida 
Bd. of Regents 528 u.s. 62 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Morrison 521J U.S. 51J8 federalism conservative 54 1999 
U.S. v. Playboy En-
tertainment Group, first 
Inc. 529 U.S. H03 amendment liberal 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 u.s ./28 procedure conservative 72 1999 
Board of Trustees 
of University of 
Alabama v. Garrett 531 u.s. 356 federalism conservative 54 2000 
U.S v. United first 
Foods. Inc. 533 u.s 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
FEC v. Colorado 
Republican Fed. first 
Campaign Cmt. 533 U.S. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 23./ amendment liberal 63 2001 
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Thompson v. West-
ern States Medical first 
Center 535 u.s 357 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Nevada Dept. of 
Human Resources 
v. Hibbs 538 u.s 721 federalism conservative 63 2002 
Federal Election 
Com'n v. first 
Beaumont 53<) u.s. 146 amendment conservative 72 2002 
McConnell v. 
Federal Election first 
Com"n 5-!IJ us <J3 amendment conservative 54 2003 
Tennessee Student 
Assistance Corp. v. 
Hood 541 u.s 440 federalism conservative 72 2003 
Tennessee v. Lane 5.Jl us 51)') federalism conservative 54 2003 
Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. I federalism conservative 63 2004 
Total 34 
Vutt! 
Justict! Ginsburg U.S. Cite Issue Area Directiun Vute Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury Employ- first 
ees Union 513 us -!5-! amendment liberal 63 1'N4 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 514 U.S. 476 amendment liberal 90 1994 
Denver Area Edu. 
Telecommunica- first 
lions v. F. C. C. 518 us 727 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Babbitt v. Youpee 5]<) u.s 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Turner Broadcast-
ing System. Inc. v. first 
F. C. C. 521! us /81) amendment liberal 54 1996 
City of Boerne v. first 
Flores 521 u.s 507 amendment conservative 63 1996 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 us 8-!.J amendment liberal 90 1996 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 u.s 360 taxation conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
U.S. v. Bajakajian 52-1 L".S 321 procedure liberal 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 u.s 173 amendment liberal 90 1998 
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U.S. v. Playboy 
Entertainment first 
Group, Inc. 511) us 803 amendment liberal 54 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 US. 428 procedure liberal 72 1999 
Legal Services 
Corp. v. first 
Velazquez 531 US. 533 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Dusenbery v. U.S. 534 US. 161 due process liberal 54 2001 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 us 134 amendment liberal 63 2001 
U.S. v. American first 
Library Ass'n, Inc. 53<; US. IY4 amendment liberal 63 2002 
criminal 
U.S. v. Booker 5-J.l us 1111 procedure liberal 54 2004 
Total 17 
Vote 
Justice Breyer U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
U.S. v. National 
Treasury first 
Employees Union 513 us ./54 amendment liberal 63 1994 
Plaut v. Spendthrift 
Farm, Inc. 514 US. 2II miscellaneous uncoded 72 1994 
Rubin v. Coors first 
Brewing Co. 514 us. 476 amendment liberal 90 1994 
Colorado Republi-
can Fed. 
Campaign Cmt. v. first 
FEC 518 us. 604 amendment liberal 72 1995 
Denver Area Educ. 
Telcoms. Consor- first 
tium v. FCC 518 US. 727 amendment liberal 72 1996 
Babbitt v. Youpee 519 us. 234 due process conservative 81 1996 
Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties first 
Union 521 us 84./ amendment liberal 90 1996 
U.S. v. U.S. Shoe federal 
Corp. 523 u.s. 360 taxation conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
U.S. v. Bajakajian 524 U.S. 321 procedure liberal 54 1997 
Greater New 
Orleans Broadcast- first 
ing Inc. v. U.S. 527 U.S. 173 amendment liberal 90 1998 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 530 u.s 4}.8 procedure liberal 72 1999 
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Legal Services 
Corp. v. first 
Velazquez 531 u.s 533 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Dusenbery v. U.S. 53.J u.s /()/ due process liberal 54 2001 
Ashcroft v. Free first 
Speech Coalition 535 u.s. 234 amendment liberal 63 2001 
Total 14 
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APPENDIX B 
VOTES TO INVALIDATE STATE LAW 
Vote 
Justice Rehnquist U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 u.s/()(, activity conservative 90 1994 
Miller v. Johnson 515 u.s. I)()() ci vi I rights conservative 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 5J(JUS325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 U.S. 34/i due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 US. -184 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Shaw v. Hunt 517 us 81)9 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 u.s 952 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 519 u.s 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Foster v. Love 52] us 67 civil rights liberal 90 1'}97 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 526 u.s 160 activity conservative 90 1998 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 u.s -158 activity conservative 90 19Y9 
Rice v. Cayetano 52/i U.S. 41)5 civil rights conservative 72 1999 
Troxel v. Granville 530 us. 57 privacy liberal 63 1Y99 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 u.s 3n3 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 531! u.s 5()7 amendment liberal 72 19YY 
Cook v. Gralike 531 U.S. 5Ui civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of 
Washington 53/i u.s 216 due process conservative 54 2002 
first 
Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 3-13 amendment liberal 72 2002 
American Ins. 
Ass'n v. 
Garamendi 539 U.S. 31)n federalism liberal 54 2002 
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Kelo v. City of 
New London. ln2 LD/.2d 
Conn. 043<) due process conservative 54 2004 
Total 21 
Vote 
Justice Stevens U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 US. !On activity conservative 90 1994 
criminal 
Harris v. Alabama 513 U.S. 5114 procedure liberal 81 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 51-JUS. 334 amendment liberal 72 1994 
California Dept. of 
Corrections v. criminal 
Morales 514 us. 4<)9 procedure liberal 72 1994 
U.S. Term Limits. 
Inc. v. Thornton 5/.J us 77<) federalism liberal 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 5J(i us 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 U.'i. 34/i due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 u.s. 41!4 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Romer v. Evans 517US.n21! civil rights liberal li3 1995 
Montana v. 
Egelhoff 51/ius 37 due process liberal 54 1995 
M.L.B. V. S.L.J. 5/<) us. /02 civil rights liberal li3 1991i 
General Motors economic 
Corp. v. Tracy 519 US. 27/i activity conservative 81 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 5/Y US. 433 procedure liberal 90 1991i 
Chandler v. Miller 520 u.s. 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New 
Party 520 US. 351 civil rights liberal li3 1991i 
Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna v. economic 
Harrison 5211 U.S. 564 activity liberal 54 1996 
Kansas v. 
Hendricks 521 US. 34n due process liberal 54 1996 
Foster v. Love 522 u.s. 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 us 287 activity conservative li3 1997 
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Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 U.S. 182 amendment liberal 63 1998 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 52ti U.S. Jnli activity conservative 90 199R 
Saenz v. Roe 526 u.s. 481) civil rights liberal 72 1998 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 U.S. 41 due process liberal 63 199R 
LA Police Dept. v. 
United Reporting first 
Pub. 52/i u.s. 32 amendment liberal 72 1999 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 u.s. 458 activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 52/i u.s. 41)5 civil rights liberal 72 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 531! u.s. 3n3 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 530 u.s. 5n7 amendment conservative 72 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 531! U.S. IJ14 privacy liberal 54 1999 
City of Indianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 u.s 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gralike 531 u.s 5/(1 civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 u.s. 525 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Kelly v. South criminal 
Carolina 534 u.s. 24n procedure liberal 54 2001 
City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda first 
Books, Inc. 535 U.S. 425 amendment liberal 54 2001 
criminal 
McKune v. Lile 536 U.S. 24 procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Soc. v. first 
Stratton 53(i u.s. I 50 amendment liberal 81 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 536 u.s 584 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Zelman v. first 
Simmons-Harris 53n u.s. n39 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Board of Ed. of 
Independent 
School District 53() u.s 822 privacy liberal 54 2001 
Ewing v. criminal 
California 53/i U.S II procedure liberal 54 2002 
criminal 
Smith v. Doe 538 u.s 84 procedure liberal 63 2002 
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first 
Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
Lawrence v. Texas 53() u.s 558 privacy liberal 63 2002 
Stogner v. criminal 
California 53() u.s. 607 procedure liberal 54 2002 
Hiibel v. lith 
Judicial Dist. criminal 
Court of Nevada 5-12 u.s. 177 procedure liberal 54 2003 
Clingman v. first 
Beaver 544 u.s. 581 amendment liberal 63 2004 
McCreary County, ln2 I..D/.2d first 
Kyv. ACLU 1172() amendment liberal 54 2004 
Total 47 
Vote 
Justice O'Connur U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 5/3 U.S. Jor, activity conservative 90 1994 
Oklahoma Tax 
Com'n v. Jefferson economic 
Lines 514 u.s. 175 activity conservative 72 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 5/.J u.s 33-1 amendment liberal 72 1994 
Miller v. Johnson 515 U.S. 900 civil rights conservative 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 5/(J u.s. 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 u.s. 34/i due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 u.s 48-1 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 civil rights liberal 63 1995 
Shaw v. Hunt 517 u.s 8()() civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. Y52 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Montana v. 
Egelhoff 518 U.S. 37 due process liberal 54 1995 
M.L.B. V. S.L.J. 5!9U.S.lli2 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 5/C) u.s 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 520 u.s. 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna v. economic 
Harrison 520 U.S 5M activity liberal 54 19Yii 
Foster v. Love 522 u.s. 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
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Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 us 21\7 activity conservative 63 1'!97 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 526 US. 160 activity conservative 90 1998 
Saenz v. Roc 52() us .J8'J civil rights liberal 72 19'!~ 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 us 41 due process liberal 63 1998 
Jefferson County. 
Ala. v. Acker 527 us 423 federalism liberal 72 1998 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 52S US 45S activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 528 us .J'J5 civil rights conservative 72 1'!'!'! 
Troxel v. Granville 530 US. 57 privacy liberal 63 1'!'!9 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 53ii us 31\.1 federalism liberal '!0 1'!'!'! 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 530 us 5()7 amendment liberal 72 1'!'!9 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart .'3ii L.S 'Jl.J privacy liberal 54 ]L)\)l) 
City of lndianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 US. 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gralike 531 us _"i/() civil rights liberal ')() 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 US. 525 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Kelly v. South criminal 
Carolina 534 US. :!.J(] procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Soc. v. first 
Sratton 536US.I50 amendment liberal 81 2001 
Board of 
Independent 
School District 53() us 822 privacy liberal 54 2001 
first 
Virginia v. Black 53S US. 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
American Ins. 
Ass'n v. 
Garamendi 53'J us 31)(] federalism liberal 54 2002 
Lawrence v. Texas 539 us 558 privacy liberal 63 2002 
Stogner v. criminal 
California 531) (;' s 61!7 procedure liberal 54 2002 
Kelo v. City of 
New London, 162 L.Erl.2d 
Conn. 043<) due process conservative 54 2004 
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McCreary County. J(j2 /_./:'d.2d first 
Kyv. ACLU 1172<) amendment liberal 54 2004 
Total 3') 
Vute 
Justice Scalia U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 U.S. Jl!(j activity conservative l)() 1l)l)4 
Miller v.Johnson 515 U.S. 900 civil rights conservative 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 5/n u.s 325 activity conservative l)O 19Y5 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 U.S. 34/i due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 u.s 484 amendment liberal 90 ]l)l)5 
Shaw v. Hunt 517 u.s 899 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. <J52 civil rights conservative 54 ]l)l)5 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 5/Y U.S. 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 521! u.s 31!5 privacy liberal Hl 19')6 
Foster v. Love 522 u.s 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 u.s 287 activity conservative 63 1997 
Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 u.s. 182 amendment liberal 63 1998 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 526 u.s /(>(! activity conservative 90 199H 
Saenz v. Roe 52n u.s. 41!9 civil rights liberal 72 1998 
Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri first 
Government PAC 528 U.S. 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 U.S. 45/i activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 528 u.s .Jl)5 civil rights conservative 72 19')9 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 u.s 363 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 531! u.s 5(>7 amendment liberal 72 19')') 
Cook v. Gralike 531 U.S. 510 civil rights liberal 90 2000 
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Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 us 525 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Soc. of first 
NY 536 US. 150 amendment liberal 81 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 53o us 584 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of 
Washington 538 us. 216 due process conservative 54 2002 
first 
Locke v. Davey 540 US. 712 amendment conservative 72 2003 
Granholm v. economic 
Heald 544 US. 460 activity liberal 54 2004 
Kelo v. City of 
New London. 1o2 L. D/.2rl 
Conn. li431.J due process conservative 54 2004 
Total 27 
Vote 
Justice Kennedy U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 US. 10r1 activity conservative 90 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 514 us. 334 amendment liberal 72 1994 
U.S. Term Limits. 
Inc. v. Thornton 5/.J US. 771.J federalism liberal 54 1994 
Miller v. Johnson 515 US. 900 civil rights conservative 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 516 us 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 us. 348 due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 us 41-14 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Romer v. Evans 517 us. 620 civil rights liberal 63 1995 
Shaw v. Hunt 517 US. 8')1.) civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Bush v. Vera 577 u.s. 952 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 5/I.J us /02 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 519 U.S. 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 5211 us 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna economic 
v.Harrison 520 us. 564 activity liberal 54 1996 
Foster v. Love 522 us. 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
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Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 U.S. 182 amendment liberal 63 1998 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 5~(\ u.s 160 activity conservative 90 199~ 
Saenz v. Roe 526 u.s. 481) civil rights liberal 72 1998 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 u.s 41 due process liberal 63 199~ 
LA Police Dept. v. 
United Reporting first 
Pub. 528 U.S. 32 amendment liberal 72 1999 
Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri first 
Government PAC 5~8 u.s 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 52/i U.S. 45/i activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 5~8 U.S 4V5 civil rights conservative 72 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 u.s. 3n3 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 530 U..'i. 567 amendment liberal 72 1999 
City of lndianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 U.S. 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gralike 531 u.s 510 civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Kelly v. South criminal 
Carolina 534 u.s 246 procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Society of first 
NY 53n u.s. 7511 amendment liberal 81 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of 
Washington 53ii u.s. 27n due process conservative 54 2002 
first 
Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
American Ins. 
Ass'n v. 
Garamendi 539 u.s 31)6 federalism liberal 54 2002 
Lawrence v. Texas 53<) u.s 558 privacy liberal 63 2002 
Granholm v. economic 
Heald 544 U.S. 4n0 activity liberal 54 2004 
Total 3() 
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Vnte 
Justice Snuter U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vnte Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 us j()(, activity conservative 90 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 514 us. 334 amendment liberal 72 1994 
California Dept. of 
Corrections v. criminal 
Morales 514 us .J'J') procedure liberal 72 1994 
U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton 514 us 779 federalism liberal 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 51() us 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 US. 3411 due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 us -!84 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Romer v. Evans 517 us 620 civil rights liberal 63 1995 
Montana v. 
Egelhoff 518 LiS 37 due process liberal 54 1995 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 519 US. 102 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 519 US. 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 520 US. 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New 
Party 520 us 351 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna v. economic 
Harrison. 520 US. 504 activity liberal 54 1996 
Kansas v. 
Hendricks 521 us 3-J(> due process liberal 54 1996 
Foster v. Love 522 us 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 us 287 activity conservative 63 1997 
Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 us. 182 amendment liberal 63 1998 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 526 us j(J() activity conservative 90 1998 
Saenz v. Roe 526 US. 4119 civil rights liberal 72 1998 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 us .Jl due process liberal 63 1998 
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Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 US. 458 activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 528 US -N5 civil rights conservative 72 1999 
Troxel v. Granville 530 us 57 privacy liberal 63 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 us 363 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 5311 US. 567 amendment liberal 72 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 5311 U.S 'Jl./ privacy liberal 54 1999 
City of lndianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 us 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gralike 531 US. 5lli civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 us. 525 amendment conservative 54 2000 
City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda first 
Books. Inc. 535 us -12.' amendment liberal 54 2001 
criminal 
McKune v. Lile 536 US. 24 procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Society of first 
NY 536 us 150 amendment liberal H1 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 536 US. 51:14 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Zelman v. first 
Simmons-Harris 536 us 63\! amendment liberal 54 2001 
Board of Inde-
pendent School 
District No. 22 536 US. X22 privacy liberal 54 2001 
Ewing v. criminal 
California 538 US II procedure liberal 54 2002 
first 
Virginia v. Black 538 us. 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
American Ins. 
Ass'n v. 
Garamendi 53\! U.S 3'J6 federalism liberal 54 2002 
Lawrence v. Texa 539 us 558 privacy liberal 63 2002 
Stogner v. criminal 
California 5.l'J us !ili7 procedure liberal 54 2002 
Hiibei v. 6th 
Judicial Dist. criminal 
Court of Nevada 542 us 177 procedure liberal 54 2003 
Granholm v. economic 
Heald 54.:1 us ./6() activity liberal 54 2004 
Clingman v. first 
Beaver 544 US. 5Xl amendment liberal 63 2004 
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McCreary County. /6]. L.Ed.J.d first 
Ky v. ACLU 07].<) amendment liberal 54 2004 
Total 45 
Vote 
Justice Thomas U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 US. 10!\ activity conservative 90 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 514 US. 334 amendment liberal 72 1994 
Miller v. Johnson 515 us <)(}() civil rights conservative 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 516 us. 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 us 3-18 due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 US. 41i4 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Shaw v. Hunt 517 us. 8<)<) civil rights conservative 54 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 us 952 civil rights conservative 54 1995 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 5/<J us -133 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 520 US. 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Foster v. Love 52]. us 67 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 us. 287 activity conservative 63 1997 
Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 us. /82 amendment liberal 63 199H 
South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 526 us.](\{} activity conservative 90 1998 
Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri Govern- first 
ment PAC 528 us 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 us. 458 activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 528 us -J<J5 civil rights conservative 72 1999 
Troxel v. Granville 530 us. 57 privacy liberal 63 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 us 363 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 530 us. 567 amendment liberal 72 1999 
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Cook v. Gralike 531 US. 510 civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 us. 525 amendment liberal 54 2000 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Society of first 
NY 53(> us. 150 amendment liberal H1 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 536 us. 584 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Brown v. Legal 
Foundation of 
Washington 538 us. 21() due process conservative 54 2002 
first 
Locke v. Davey 540 US. 712 amendment conservative 72 2003 
Kelo v. City of 
New London, Jn2 t .. t:·t1.2d 
Conn. O.J.N due process conservative 54 2004 
Total 27 
Vote 
Justice Ginsburg U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 US. 11!() activity conservative 90 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elections Com'n 514 US. 334 amendment liberal 72 1994 
U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton 5/.J US. 779 federalism liberal 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 516 US. 325 activity conservative 90 1995 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 us 348 due process liberal 90 19Y5 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 us. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Romer v. Evans 517 US. n21i civil rights liberal 63 1995 
M.L.B. V. S.L.J. 519 US. 102 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis 519 us 433 procedure liberal 90 1996 
Chandler v. Miller 52(} us. 305 privacy liberal 81 1996 
Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New 
Party 521! us. 351 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
Kansas v. 
Hendricks 521 us. 346 due process liberal 54 1996 
Foster v. Love 522 US. o7 civil rights liberal 90 1997 
Buckley v. Am. 
Constitutional first 
Law Found. 525 US. 182 amendment liberal 63 1998 
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South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 5~() us loU activity conservative 90 199H 
Saenz v. Roe 526 us 48') civil rights liberal 72 1998 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 us 41 due process liberal 63 199H 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 u.s 458 activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 528 us -+95 civil rights liberal 72 1999 
Troxel v. Granville 530 US. 57 privacy liberal 63 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 5311 US. 3o3 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 5.W U.S. 567 amendment conservative 72 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 5.W US. 1.)/4 privacy liberal 54 1999 
City of Indianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 u.s 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gra!ike 531 us 5/li civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 U.S. 525 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Kelly v. South criminal 
Carolina 534 u.s ~4(J procedure liberal 54 2001 
City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda first 
Books, Inc. 535 u.s 425 amendment liberal 54 2001 
criminal 
McKune v. Lile 53() u.s 24 procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Society of first 
NY 536 U.S. !50 amendment liberal 81 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 53() US. 584 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Zelman v. first 
Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 amendment liberal 54 2001 
Board of lnde-
pendent School 
District No. 22 53o u.s 822 privacy liberal 54 2001 
Ewing v. criminal 
California 538 U.S. II procedure liberal 54 2002 
criminal 
Smith v. Doe 538 US. 84 procedure liberal 63 2002 
first 
Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
Lawrence v. Texas 5.N U.S 558 privacy liberal 63 2002 
Stogner v. criminal 
California 539 u.s ()()7 procedure liberal 54 2002 
Hiibel v. 6th 542 u.s 177 criminal liberal 54 2003 
2007] JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 93 
J udic1al Dist procedure 
Court of Nevada 
Granholm v. economic 
Heald 544 us 4fJI! activity liberal 54 2004 
Clingman v. first 
Beaver 5-N U.S 581 amendment liberal li3 2004 
McCreary County. Jn2 L.Ed.2d first 
Kyv. ACLU OW! amendment liberal 54 2004 
Total 42 
Vote 
Justice Breyer U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
economic 
Reich v. Collins 513 us /li(J activity conservative l)() 1lJlJ4 
Oklahoma Tax 
Com'n v. Jefferson economic 
Lines, Inc. 514USJ75 activity conservative 72 1994 
Mcintyre v. Ohio first 
Elect10ns Com'n 51-1 us 33.:1 amendment liberal 72 1\1\14 
U.S. Term Limits. 
Inc. v. Thornton 514 us 77') federalism liberal 54 1994 
Fulton Corp. v. economic 
Faulkner 5/n U.'J .i25 activity conservative l)() 1\195 
Cooper v. 
Oklahoma 517 us 348 due process liberal 90 1995 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island _'i/7 us .:18.:1 amendment liberal l)() 1 \llJ5 
Romer v. Evans 517 us (l2() civil rights liberal 63 1\195 
Montana v. 
Egelhoff 518 L'.S. 37 due process liberal 54 1 \llJ5 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 51() us /02 civil rights liberal 63 1996 
criminal 
Lynce v. Mathis _'i/') cs .:133 procedure liberal \1() 1lJ\IIi 
Chandler v. Miller 520 us 305 privacy liberal 81 1991i 
Camps Newfound/ 
Owatonna v. economic 
Harrison 5:!0 us 5(J.J activity liberal 54 19% 
Kansas v. 
Hendricks 521 us 346 due process liberal 54 19\16 
Foster v. Love 52.' us (>7 civil rights liberal l)() 1lJlJ7 
Lunding v. New 
York Tax Appeals economic 
Tribunal 522 us 287 activity conservative 63 19\17 
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South Central Bell 
Telephone v. economic 
Alabama 52n U.'i. loli activity conservative 90 1998 
Saenz v. Roe 52o US. 4/i'J civil rights liberal 72 1998 
City of Chicago v. 
Morales 527 US. 41 due process liberal 63 1998 
Jefferson County. 
Ala. v. Acker 527 us. 423 federalism liberal 72 1998 
Hunt-Wesson v. 
Franchise Tax Bd. economic 
of Cal. 528 us 458 activity conservative 90 1999 
Rice v. Cayetano 52/l us 495 civil rights conservative 72 1999 
Troxel v. Granville 530 us 57 privacy liberal 63 1999 
Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade 
Council 530 u.s 3ti3 federalism liberal 90 1999 
California Democ- first 
ratic Party v. Jones 530 us. 5(>7 amendment liberal 72 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 530 us 914 privacy liberal 54 1999 
City of Indianapo- criminal 
lis v. Edmond 531 us 32 procedure liberal 63 2000 
Cook v. Gralike 531 US. 510 civil rights liberal 90 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco first 
Co. v. Reilly 533 u.s 525 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Kelly v. South criminal 
Carolina 534 u.s 246 procedure liberal 54 2001 
City of Los Ange-
les v. Alameda first 
Books. Inc. 535 us -125 amendment liberal 54 2001 
criminal 
McKune v. Lile 53ti u.s 24 procedure liberal 54 2001 
Watchtower Bible 
& Tract Society of first 
NY 53() u.s /50 amendment liberal 81 2001 
criminal 
Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 5R4 procedure liberal 72 2001 
Zelman v. first 
Simmons- Harris 53() us 6.\'J amendment liberal 54 2001 
Ewing v. criminal 
California 538 u.s. 11 procedure liberal 54 2002 
criminal 
Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. S-1 procedure liberal 63 2002 
first 
Virginia v. Black 53/l u.s 343 amendment liberal 72 2002 
American Ins. 
Ass'n v. 
Garamendi 53') us 3')(i federalism liberal 54 2002 
Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 55R privacy liberal 63 2002 
Stogner v. 53') u.s ()(!7 criminal liberal 54 2002 
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California procedure 
Hiibel v. 6th 
Judicial Dist. criminal 
Court of Nevada 542 u.s 177 procedure liberal 54 2003 
Granholm v. economic 
Heald 5-14 u.s 460 activity liberal 54 2004 
McCreary County, 162 L.Ed.2d first 
Kyv. ACLU 0729 amendment liberal 54 2004 
Total 44 
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APPENDIXC 
VOTES TO OVERTURN PRECEDENT 
Vote 
Justice Rehnquist U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
Ada rand 
Constructors. Inc. 
v. Pena 515 US. 200 civil rights conservative 54 1994 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515US.506 procedure liberal 90 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 US-N federalism conservative 54 1995 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 US. 41:14 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 us. 70(, judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Lewis v. Casey 518 us. 343 due process conservative 81 1995 
first 
Agostini v. Felton 521 US. 203 amendment conservative 54 1996 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 us. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hudson v. u.s 522 us <J3 procedure conservative 90 1997 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 us. 666 federalism conservative 54 1998 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 531) us 7<J3 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 530 us. 974 privacy conservative 54 1999 
Total 12 
Vote 
Justice Ste.-ens U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U S. 514 us !i<J5 procedure liberal 63 1994 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515 us. 506 procedure liberal 90 1994 
44 Liquormart. 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 us 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 517 us. 706 judicial power liberal 90 1995 
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Allstate Ins. Co. 
Bush v. Vera 517U.S 'J52 civil rights liberal 54 1995 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 u.s. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
Jefferson v. City 
of Tarrant, Ala. 522 u.s 75 judicial power liberal ill 1997 
criminal 
Hohn v. U.S. 524 U.S. 236 procedure liberal 54 1997 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 7'J3 amendment liberal 63 1999 
Total 9 
Vote 
Justice O'Connor U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
Ada rand 
Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena 515 u.s. 21!1! civil rights conservative 54 1994 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515 U.S. 50!5 procedure liberal 90 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 u.s ./4 federalism conservative 54 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 u.s. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 u.s 70() judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Lewis v. Casey 518 u.s. 343 due process conservative 81 1995 
first 
Agostini v. Felton 521 u.s 21!3 amendment conservative 54 1996 
City of Boerne v. 
Flores 521 U.S. 507 judicial power liberal 63 1996 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 u.s .l activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hudson v. U.S. 522 U.S. 'J3 procedure conservative 90 1997 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 u.s. oM federalism conservative 54 199il 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 u.s 793 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Total 12 
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Vote 
Justice Scalia U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
Allied-Bruce 
Terminix v. Dob-
son 513 u.s. 2n5 federalism conservative 72 1994 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U.S. 514 U.S. 695 procedure liberal 63 1994 
Adarand 
Constructors. Inc. 
v. Pena 515 U.S 21HI civil rights conservative 54 1994 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515 u.s. 506 procedure liberal 90 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 U.S . .J4 federalism conservative 54 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 U.S. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517U.S 7110 judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Lewis v. Casey 518 u.s. 343 due process conservative 81 1995 
first 
Agostini v. Felton 521 u.s 2113 amendment conservative 54 1996 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 U.S. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hudson v. u.s. 522 u.s 'J3 procedure conservative 90 1997 
Campbell v. 
Louisiana 523 U.S. 392 civil rights conservative 72 1997 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 U.S. Mo federalism conservative 54 1998 
Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri first 
Government PAC 528 U.S. 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 5311 u.s 428 procedure conservative 72 1999 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 793 amendment conservative 63 1999 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart s.w u.s l)/.J privacy conservative 54 1999 
criminal 
Texas v. Cobb 532 u.s. 162 procedure conservative 54 2000 
Federal Election 
Com'n v. first 
Colorado Rep. 533 U.S. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Total 19 
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Vote 
Justice Kennedy U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U.S. 514US.fi<J5 procedure liberal 63 1994 
Ada rand 
Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena 515 US. 200 civil rights conservative 54 1994 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515US51io procedure liberal 90 1994 
Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida 517 US. 44 federalism conservative 54 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 US. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 US. 706 judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Lewis v. Casey 518 US .. l./3 due process conservative H1 1995 
first 
Agostini v. Felton 521 US. 203 amendment conservative 54 1996 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 52~ us 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hudson v. U.S. 522 US. 93 procedure conservative 90 1997 
criminal 
Hohn v. U.S. 524 US. 236 procedure liberal 54 1997 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 us 666 federalism conservative 54 1998 
Nixon v. Shrink 
Missouri first 
Government PAC 5~8 us 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
ftrst 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 US. 7Y3 amendment conservative 63 1999 
criminal 
Texas v. Cobb 53~ US. 1fi~ procedure conservative 54 2000 
Federal Election 
Com'n v. first 
Colorado Rep. 533 US. 431 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Total 16 
Vote 
Justice Souter U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515 us 50(> procedure liberal 90 1994 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 US. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
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Quackenbush v 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517G.S. 7111\ JUdicial power liberal 90 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 us. 952 civil rights liberal 54 1995 
State Oil Co.,._ economic 
Khan 5.2~ U .. "•l. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hohn v. U.S. 524 us 23n procedure liberal 54 1997 
first 
\1itchcll v. Helms 53() us 7'J3 amendment liberal ()3 1999 
Total 7 
Vute Direc· 
Justice Thomas U.S. Cite Issue Area tion Vute Term 
Allied-Bruce Ter-
minix \'. Dobson 513 us :'_()5 federalism conservative 72 1994 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U.S. 514 US. n95 procedure liberal 63 1994 
Ada rami 
Constructors. Inc. 
\'. Pena 5/_'i L' s :'_1!1! civil rights conservative 54 1994 
criminal 
C.S. v. Gaudin 5!5 us. 50n procedure liberal 90 1994 
Seminole Tnbc of 
Florida v. Florida 517 L' S -1-1 federalism conservative 54 1995 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 577 u.s. 484 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 us 71!1\ judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Lewis v. Casey 51RU.5.343 due process conservative 81 1995 
first 
Agostini v. Felton 521 U.S. :'.113 amendment conservative 54 199h 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 U.S. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hudson v. US. 522 us 'J3 procedure conservative 90 1997 
Campbell v. 
Louisiana 523 u.s. 392 civil rights conservative 72 1997 
criminal 
Mitchell v. U.S. 521\ u.s 31-1 procedure conservative 54 1998 
College Sav. Bank 
v. Florida Prepaid 527 u.s 606 federalism conservative 54 1998 
l'ixon v. Shrink 
Mtssouri first 
Government PAC 528 r..; s 377 amendment conservative 63 1999 
criminal 
Dickerson v. U.S. 5311 u.s. 428 procedure conservative 72 1999 
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first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 us 7\13 amendment conservative 63 lYYY 
Stenberg v. 
Carhart 530 US. 974 privacy conservative 54 1YYY 
criminal 
Texas v. Cobb 532 us /()2 procedure conservative 54 2000 
Cooper Industries, 
Inc. v. economic 
Leatherman 532 US. 424 activity conservative 81 2000 
U.S. v. United first 
Foods, Inc. 533 us 405 amendment liberal 63 2000 
Federal Election 
Com'n v. first 
Colorado Rep. 533 u.s. 437 amendment conservative 54 2000 
Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Reilly 533 u.s 525 federalism liberal 54 2000 
Total 23 
Vote 
Justice Ginsburg U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U.S. 514 us ()1.)5 procedure liberal 63 IYY4 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 575 US. 506 procedure liberal 90 1994 
44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 577 us .J84 amendment liberal YO 1YY5 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 U.S. 706 judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Bush v. Vera 577 us 952 civil rights liberal 54 19Y5 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 u.s. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hahn v. U.S. 524 u.s. 23n procedure liberal 54 1YY7 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 u.s. 793 amendment liberal 63 1999 
Total H 
Vote 
Justice Breyer U.S. Cite Issue Area Direction Vote Term 
criminal 
Hubbard v. U.S. 514US.n95 procedure liberal 63 IYY4 
criminal 
U.S. v. Gaudin 515 U.S. 50n procedure liberal YO 1994 
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44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode first 
Island 517 u.s. 41'4 amendment liberal 90 1995 
Quackenbush v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. 517 u.s. 706 judicial power liberal 90 1995 
Bush v. Vera 517 U.S. 'J52 civil rights liberal 54 1995 
City of Boerne v. 
Flores 521 U.S. 507 judicial power liberal 63 1996 
State Oil Co. v. economic 
Khan 522 U.S. 3 activity liberal 90 1997 
criminal 
Hohn v. U.S. 524 u.s. 236 procedure liberal 54 1997 
first 
Mitchell v. Helms 530 U.S. 7f.J3 amendment conservative 63 1999 
criminal 
Daniels v. U.S. 532 U.S. 374 procedure liberal 54 2000 
Total 10 
